Media unwittingly promoting terrorism

ReporterBy Masror Hausen

"As some remarkable terrorist attacks in history indicate, whether it is in the United States, Europe, or the Middle East, it is by and large the case that the architects of terrorism exploit the media for the benefit of their operational efficiency, information gathering, recruitment, fund raising and propaganda schemes."-- Brigitte Nacos

Pakistani Media flourished as a result of the terror attacks in the same way as it benefits when a poor girl is raped or a psychotic man kills his wife and children. All these make news. There is a stark difference between a terrorist attack and social crime but it is fair to argue that there is a mutually beneficial relationship between terrorism and today’s media.

Reporters who cover bomb-blasts from Karachi to Peshawar are never afraid because they have confidence that their camera was, unwittingly, multiplying the terror effect, the terrorists would never hurt them and in fact they would protect them in danger. A reporter has to give each and every minor detail, however gory, to secure/justify their job. Reporters who create or act out an alarming tone and face expression are preferred over cool-voiced reporters.

When that panic creating report runs live in the bulletin with footage, it obviously transfers that panic to the millions of viewers. Viewers get alarmed and in some funny way they begin to like it. I yet have to see a viewer who would switch over from the coverage of a bomb blast to a sports or a drama channel. Viewers love to be scared just as so many people go to  horror movies. Fear diverts attention from mundane problems of which viewers don't have solutions. The role of the reporter is, therefore, crucial in holding the viewers' attention.

Crooked governments love such coverage because it keeps their voters in a state of perpetual fear psychosis and keeps them from pointing fingers at the election promises, governance follies and of course corruption.

Since a bulletin with such live coverage with "breaking news" impact attracts most viewers, the advertisers flock to place their ad right there in that bulletin on that channel. And TV channel owners love it. They have invested millions and they want to make money fast so they love anything that attracts viewers and advertisers' money.

On a day when there is no such incident, the production team feels bored. "Aaj thund hai yar, kia karein." Instead of feeling good on a relaxed day their hearts pound because they know the Channel would retrench them if there was no "meat" in the bulletin and bring in cheaper producers.

Terrorists probably know the mechanics of the media. They know that their activity is loved as much by the media owners as it is by the producers and reporters/camera crew.

There is an irony here. In a Western democracy, press/media is the fourth pillar entrusted with the role of keeping an eye on the executive and the public kitty. When they cover a bomb blast they are theoretically showing the mirror to the government and reminding it of its duty of safeguarding the lives of the people. 

Therefore, if one believes in the antics of democracy, there is no gagging the press/media. That will be termed "anti-democratic," "unconstitutional" and violation of the "freedom of expression." At the same time any suggestion to the media is discouraged as an attempt to interfere in the freedom of the press and is looked at with disdain.

But at the same time these antics of democracy which we all like and support so much are multiplying the terrorist affect with the aim of subduing the public to the point of accepting the demands of the terrorists and at the same time it steals away the legitimacy of the government for failing to protect their lives and limbs. Media is being abused by the terrorists, it has been hijacked.

Outspoken, independent and patriotic journalists have been sidelined or thrown out. 

Terrorism cannot be tamed through the media unless of course we stop the flow of cash from the advertisers (by requesting the business houses) and kill the media. This scenario is workable but pretty far-fetched as it will attract a lot of flak from the business community which will turn around and take their complaint to the government and the international community.

In conclusion, media is not the place to go to stop terrorism. A functional democracy, prospering society and a lion-heart leader is the only way to snatch away the space and the narrative from the militants, restore confidence in the country and steer out of a situation that has started to resemble the situation in 1971 so much.

Refugees recall the Taliban nighmare

Around half a million IDPs
ISLAMABAD: Displaced people from North Waziristan agency have spoken out against Pakistani Taliban’s nightmarish hold of their tribal region bordering Afghanistan, saying they destroyed their social structure and traditions.
Some of the tens of thousands of people from Waziristan, who have taken shelter in Bannu following Pakistani military’s anti-Taliban operation, told a reporter of The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) that “unbalanced, gun-toting” young militants had let loose a reign of terror in the area, bringing violence and uncertainty to daily life.
During the past decade, according to the dispatch, North Waziristan had become a haven for thousands of Pakistani Taliban, al Qaeda, Afghan insurgents and militants from across the world, including Europe.
“Everyone feared being kidnapped by the Taliban at any time, said “Zia-ur-Rehman, who ran a pharmacy in Miranshah. “Everyone knew someone who was picked up by the Taliban.”
The non-militant inhabitants of North Waziristan were mostly traders or farmers, and almost all families had kin working as labourers in the oil-rich Gulf countries who send money home, it was pointed out.
They enjoyed a tribal structure that provided relative stability and security. Then the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 forced elements from the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda to take refuge there.
They inspired local tribesmen to form a Pakistani version of the Taliban, originally under a warlord named Nek Mohammad, who was killed in 2004 in the first US drone strike within Pakistan.
By 2007, when Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was established, the local militants had grown much more radical, closer to Al Qaeda than to the Afghan Taliban, and turning on Pakistani state rather than fighting the “infidel” US Army in Afghanistan.
The TTP has since then killed hundreds of Waziristan elders, locals told WSJ, wiping out the traditional leadership, which could have led resistance.
A 2009 military operation in South Waziristan sent more TTP and other militants, especially ethnic Uzbeks, into North Waziristan, concentrating violent extremism there, with sleeper cells across the country.
“If anyone would have spoken against Taliban or gave information, his head would be lying at your feet the very next morning,” Gul Naeem Wazir, who came to Bannu from the Spinwan area of North Waziristan with 28 family members, was quoted as saying.
Gul Naeem Wazir said the Pakistani Taliban “eliminated” the social structure and traditions of the region, which were based on a loose system of governance by tribal elders, known as “Maliks,” and a “jirga,” or court of elders, to settle disputes.
Instead of rule by elders, previously marginalised and poor young men, in their 20s and early 30s, with long hair and shaggy beards, became powerful as Taliban commanders, recruiting an army of even younger gunmen and suicide bombers.
“You could see them in the bazaar, morning, afternoon or night,” Zia-ur-Rehman of Miramshah was quoted as saying. “Or they would drive around in cars with blacked-out windows.”
“I was happy before. But then these long-haired men came and destroyed our lives,” Mohammad Rauf, a 55-year-old from a village near Miranshah, said. “Whoever went near them, especially children would have their minds infected.”
Locals said that apart from militants from Central Asia with distinctive facial features ‘Uzbeks, Tajiks and Uighurs from China’ it was hard to tell whether the gunmen belonged to the TTP, local warlord Gul Bahadur, or the Haqqani network, which fights in Afghanistan.
The Uzbeks, more educated than the TTP, used to spend a lot of time in the Internet cafes of Miramshah and the town of Mir Ali, Nizam Dawar, who runs a non-governmental organisation that works in North Waziristan, told WSJ.
“People eventually realised that they made a mistake by giving these militants space,” Dawar said. “But by then it was too late.“
Over 100 Hindus are among thousands of people who have fled the restive North Waziristan tribal region due to Pakistan military's operation against Taliban militants, media reported on Friday. 

The members of this small vulnerable minority group are among more than 450,000 people forced to flee the onslaught which was launched on June 15 against the local and foreign militants hiding in the area. 

Most of the Hindus belong to the Balmiki caste and lived in the militancy-infested North Waziristan throughout the troubled years, the Nation reported.

Where have all the militants gone?

After years of reluctance, Pakistan's infantry and special services troops have finally moved into "militant central" - Miranshah in North Waziristan.
The town has served as the joint command-and-control centre of powerful local groups and their foreign allies in the tribal region, believed to be the last major militant sanctuary in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
Troops moved in from a nearby garrison early on Monday following two weeks of aerial bombardment to soften militant targets ahead of the ground offensive. Officials had ordered the evacuation of nearly half a million people from the area to deprive the militants of "human shields".
So what have we discovered on day one of the ground offensive?
In the absence of the media, the only source of information is the military. It has reported the killing of some "militants" in a shootout, the discovery of some tunnels and a few factories that manufactured improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
But there is no word, for example, about the top- or mid-ranking leadership of the main groups that were entrenched in the area, such as the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), the Haqqani network, the many foreigners, or the three native Waziristan-based militant groups.
Recent evidence suggests that most of these groups have already left the regions around Miranshah and the other main town in North Waziristan, Mir Ali.
The most prominent among these are the Uzbek fighters allied to the TTP who claimed the 7 June assault on Karachi airport, and are believed by many to be one of the two major targets of the current operation, along with the TTP.
They are mostly believed to have slipped into Afghanistan's Khost province after Pakistani troops left a section of the border unmanned for a couple of weeks prior to the operation.
Others who might have pulled off a similar disappearing act are the Haqqani network's leaders. They have traditionally had sanctuaries in Khost as well as in Pakistan's Kurram tribal district and, despite official denials, are known to have enjoyed freedom of movement through security checkpoints in the region.
Waziristan's native Taliban and their Afghan allies still roam the vast Waziristan hinterland south and west of Miranshah. They are armed and mobile.
But their leaders - Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Bahawal Khan (alias Salahuddin Ayubi, who heads the group once led by Mullah Nazir), and Khan Said Sajna of the Mehsud faction (which has split from the TTP leadership) - have voiced no opposition to the Pakistani assault.
The Pakistani authorities, too, have not hinted that they might want to control all of this land, although they did carry out some air raids in the area possibly to hit some remnants of the TTP.
There are also no boots on the ground in the Wana region of neighbouring South Waziristan, which is part of the extended Waziristan sanctuary.
So, the overall picture is one of a military ground assault which is taking place at a time when most of the apparent "adversaries" have disappeared from the scene.
Many of them are reported to have crossed into Afghanistan and may play a potentially destabilising role there once all Nato combat troops leave by the end of the year.
For many analysts this was not entirely unexpected.
Pakistan has long been accused by its critics of trying to control Afghanistan so as to prevent its arch-rival India from using that country to open up a "second front" against Pakistan.
Pakistan has been widely accused of using militant groups as proxies to control Afghanistan and destabilise India.
But since many Islamist militants now consider Pakistan itself to be a legitimate target, analysts say Pakistan may not want the Taliban to be ascendant in post-Nato Afghanistan.
They say for Pakistan, the current operation is more about pushing the militants into Afghanistan or scattering them across the countryside instead of outright eliminating them. They believe Pakistan may still need some of these groups as leverage in Afghanistan to check Indian influence.
So Pakistan's main objective at the moment appears to be to secure its border against a possible reverse flow of hostile groups from post-Nato Afghanistan.
But it is also trying to keep its options open - what it plans to do about those left on its soil remains to be seen.

75,000 refugees flee to Afghanistan

Internally-Displaced Persons
MATUN, Afghanistan, July 2 (UNHCR)  A military offensive in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal region has forced more than 75,000 people to flee their homes over the past two weeks, seeking shelter across the border in Afghanistan's Khost and Paktika provinces. Many left suddenly, with very few possessions.
"We could only manage to get ourselves out of Miranshah," one man told UNHCR staff, referring to the capital of the mountainous North Waziristan region. "We left all our belongings. The Pakistani government was bombing our villages," he claimed.
UNHCR, the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization and other partners are working to coordinate relief efforts and deliver assistance, providing tents and other basic relief items to the most vulnerable. However, sanitation, clean drinking water and medical care are in short supply, and although local communities have generously welcomed the displaced, already scarce resources are now reaching capacity.
Humanitarian assistance is urgently needed to support the host communities in sustaining the level of assistance they have been providing to displaced families. "I would also like to call upon the Afghan government and international community to assist these displaced families," said Wali, a local man who has been hosting four families from MIranshah in his home in Khost province's Matun district.
A former refugee in Pakistan, Wali said: "We were assisted by Waziristanis during the 1980s, when we fled Khost [during the Soviet occupation]. They welcomed us and extended their generous support. It is now our moral duty and obligation to assist and help these needy families."
One new arrival, Hassan, said he was grateful for Wali's generosity to his family, one among some 12,100 (75,000 people) to have so far crossed into the eastern Afghanistan provinces of Khost and Paktika. But Hassan noted that "although we were lucky to get the shelter here, there are still hundreds of families who are living in the open without any shelter."
In Pakistan, the government estimates that the latest fighting has left some 470,000 people internally displaced. Many have sought safety in the Khyber-Pakhtunkwa province.

Ex-general says operation delay cost lives

Q: Why do you think that 2010-11 was the right time to have launched the North Waziristan operation?
A: As compared to any other area, the army has suffered heavily in North Waziristan because a large-scale military operation was not carried out there. When we conducted the South Waziristan operation in 2009, we isolated the TTP. That operation was successful. At that time the army warned the North Waziristan tribes that if they allowed the TTP Mehsuds to migrate into their area, this would warrant a military operation.

But they [TTP members] kept concentrating [their forces] and virtually took over Mirali, Machis and other areas. Then they allowed in the Punjabi Taliban, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and the Ilyas Kashmiri group.

The tribes somehow made deals with groups such as that of Hafiz Gul Bahadur, with a ‘live and let live’ understanding. But the equation changed and the tribes were in no position to dictate their terms when the militants violated some conditions.

The militants had a more powerful hold on the area as compared to the virtually unarmed tribesmen. The militants also were violating clauses of their deals with the government and the army. They were attacking the military. In one ambush in 2010, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, which was supposed to be in an agreement with us, killed 40 of our soldiers, including a commanding officer.

Q: What was the military top brass’ opinion about launching an operation in 2010-11?
A: The final decision, of course, was always that of the chief, but formation commanders recommended that unless we launched an offensive in the area and cleared it, we wouldn’t be able to control the spread of militancy and terrorism. As their hub was North Waziristan, everyone in the area was of the opinion that eventually, we would have to go for it.

Many of us were of the same opinion: the more we delayed, the more complex things would become. But another group believed that the militant groups or tribes on our side would turn against us and join the militant groups [in case the operation was launched].

But the fact is that the tribes were violating the clauses, the militant groups were violating agreements and whatever members of the Haqqani network were there in the area, were very few. The Haqqanis were mostly operating from Paktia and Khost [in Afghanistan]. The other concern was how to expel them [militants], how to displace them. The other factor on his [Gen Kayani’s] mind was, what will become of the IDPs?

But the fact was that a few of us were of the opinion that nothing was going to change as far as our administration, government and other agencies were concerned. Those would remain the same, but it [a delay] would complicate matters more because there would be more consolidation of the militants in the area.

I can say with confidence that we are vindicated. It has now become a much bigger problem.

Q: Do you think that Gen Kayani was afraid of a personal attack against him?
A: I don’t think so, but certainly there was the vulnerability of towns and cities because there was weakness in our law enforcement, the civilian law-enforcement agencies. They were so much in disarray. So this was also the concern. But now, too, the vulnerability is the same; the retaliation may occur.

There was also no political consensus and therefore he thought a military operation would not find political support. And there would be a strong reaction by the religious right. He also apprehended that they would directly attack him.

That became his main concern.

Q: Can we say that he was concerned about religious hardliners’ backlash towards him?
A: He was concerned about the reaction of the religious right. But the fact was that the ruling party, the Awami National Party and the MQM were all for an all-out operation. They were all along for the operation, barring the right-of-centre parties and, of course, the religious right. I don’t know how concerned he was about his personal security or safety.

Q: What made the current military leadership go for this operation?
A: For six years, he [Gen Kayani] kept vacillating over the issue and in six months, this leader decided that this is the crux of the problem. He took a decision. It’s a matter of how decisive you are, how much you have the ability to sift essentials from non-essentials.

Q: How much do you think the country has suffered for not launching the operation in 2010-11?
A: We have suffered more than 50,000 civilian causalities owing to this. Not everything happened because of North Waziristan, but it was the main source. Over 5,000 soldiers were killed and 10,000 more lost limbs.

There are the economic losses and the huge loss to Pakistan’s international image.

Q: Was the Haqqani network also a factor of delay?
A: It was one of the overriding factors. And as I said whatever the elements of the Haqqanis were there, intelligence [agencies] was supposed to manage them. You can’t allow these groups to keep creating problems.

Q: Why has your revelation about Gen Kayani’s indecision come now?
A: I was to give an interview to the BBC on the military operation. The issue came up. They asked why now, why not earlier? When we got into that, things started coming up and I had to face the truth squarely.

Q: Do you think that there should be action against the former army chief for this costly indecision?
A: That is not a fair question to ask. I think history will judge.

Waziristan op now backed by antiterror law


Pakistan’s Parliament on Wednesday approved sweeping new powers for the country’s security forces, with an antiterrorism measure that the government says is needed to combat the Taliban, but that rights activists warned could result in state-sponsored human rights violations.

The Protection of Pakistan Bill 2014 allows the security forces to shoot suspects on sight, arrest suspects without a warrant and withhold information about where detainees are being held or what they are being charged with.

It comes at a time of great public trepidation in Pakistan. The military is engaged in a large-scale offensive against the Pakistan Taliban and allied jihadist groups in the North Waziristan tribal district. Many Pakistanis fear violent militant reprisals in the country’s main cities.

In presenting the measure, one cabinet minister, Zahid Hamid, said it would “send a message that the government stands with the military in the operation against terrorists.”

The bill offers “statutory cover to armed forces which are fighting against the enemies of the country for the revival of peace and stability,” Mr. Hamid added.

But rights groups and civil rights activists said the legislation risked curbing civil liberties in a country with an already abysmal record of human rights violations.

“It is an attack on the rights of the people,” said I. A. Rehman, a veteran activist with the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. “It is very difficult to swallow.”

Military and some civilian leaders have long complained that flaws in the country’s criminal justice system have hampered their ability to fight militant groups.

Militants are rarely convicted in court, often because witnesses refuse to testify or judges are afraid to hear such cases, and there is no witness protection system to speak of. Trials move at a sluggish pace, often taking several years.

But the new legislation, critics say, provides legal cover for practices that have more frequently been denounced as human rights abuses and have often embarrassed the military in the news media. Thousands of people have been illegally detained at the hands of the country’s powerful intelligence agency, often on suspicion of involvement in militancy, or in the insurgency in the western province of Baluchistan.

The major opposition parties originally opposed the draft bill, which was presented before Parliament early this year, as a draconian measure.

But the amended bill that passed Wednesday contained provisions for judicial oversight and review, and was supported by the largest opposition party, the Pakistan Peoples Party, as well as the Muttahida Qaumi Movement Party, which dominates in Karachi.

The new measure doubles the maximum prison sentence for those convicted of terrorism offenses, allows security forces to hold suspects for up to 60 days and empowers senior police and armed forces officials to issue “shoot on sight” orders.

The security forces are allowed to search a building without a warrant, provided they justify their actions to a special judicial magistrate within two days. Intercepted cellphone communications will be admissible in court as evidence.

Several conservative opposition parties refused to endorse the new legislation. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, which is led by the former cricketer Imran Khan, abstained from the vote. Jamaat-e-Islami, the country’s biggest religious political party, opposed the legislation.

During Wednesday’s parliamentary session, Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, a former minister and opposition politician, suggested that the law could be easily exploited by the country’s heavily politicized police force.

For all its stringent powers, however, one pressing question about the Protection of Pakistan law is whether the country’s weak judicial system can enforce its provisions.
Law enforcement agencies have struggled to fully carry out the existing antiterrorism law, or even basic provisions of the criminal code.

For instance, the antiterrorism courts in Karachi, which has a history of militant and sectarian violence, have yet to see a case dealing with terrorism financing because the police lack the resources and training for such an investigation.

Specialized antiterrorism courts in the city have obtained convictions in a small number of high-profile cases, including local leaders of the banned anti-Shiite militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. But legal experts say the system has done little to stem the broader surge of militancy in Karachi.

“The existing law wasn’t utilized properly, and now they’ve brought a new one,” said Abdul Maroof Maher, a prosecutor based in Karachi. The government would have been better, Mr. Maher said, to improve the existing laws and improve the shoddy courts infrastructure.

But the new legislation has the backing of the country’s civil and military leadership.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made a rare appearance in the national assembly when the legislation was presented on Wednesday. Pakistan’s president, Mamnoon Hussain, is expected to sign it into law this week.
(www.nytimes.com)